

Message Text

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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
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USMISSION GENEVA FOR NSC STAFF MEMBER HUNTER

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM PEPR GW
SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY GERMAN PREFERENCES IN THE
GRAY AREA

REFS: (A) BONN 1327; (B) BONN 11724

SUMMARY. THE GERMANS ARE WORKING HARD TO PREPARE
THEMSELVES FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH US AND OTHER ALLIES
ON GRAY AREA SYSTEMS. THEY EXPECT TO HAVE THEIR
STUDIES COMPLETED BY THE END OF THE SUMMER AND HOPE
TO ENGAGE US IN CONSULTATIONS BY SEPTEMBER.

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THE PRINCIPAL GERMAN CONCERN LIES IN THE AREA OF
DETERRENCE. THE GERMANS WANT THE DETERRENT FACTOR
IN WESTERN STRATEGY TO REMAIN ABSOLUTELY UNQUESTIONED
AND UNQUESTIONABLE. THEY ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT
THE SOVIET BUILDUP. THEY ALSO NOW BELIEVE THAT A
NUMBER OF WESTERN POLICY DECISIONS OVER THE PAST FEW

YEARS HAVE MADE IT EASIER FOR THE SOVIETS TO GAIN
SUPERIORITY IN WHAT THEY TERM "STRATEGIC THEATER
SYSTEMS," AND THEY WANT TO MAKE SURE THIS SORT OF
THING DOES NOT HAPPEN AGAIN.

OUR PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF WHAT THE GERMAN STUDIES

WILL CONCLUDE, AND OF WHAT THE CHANCELLOR WILL DESIRE,
IS AS FOLLOWS:

--THE GERMANS WILL WANT SALT III TO INCLUDE GRAY AREA
SYSTEMS, WHICH THEY DEFINE AS SYSTEMS HAVING THEATER
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS (I.E., NOT TACTICAL).

--THE GERMANS WOULD LIKE THE UNITED STATES TO BE THE
NEGOTIATOR, WITH SOME NATO MECHANISM TO COORDINATE
WESTERN POSITIONS.

--THE GERMANS REGARD THIS ISSUE AS PRINCIPALLY A
POLITICAL PROBLEM, TO BE SOLVED BY NEGOTIATIONS IF POS-
SIBLE, THOUGH PERHAPS WITH SOME MODEST BUILDUP TO SUP-
PORT THE NEGOTIATORS AND TO AVOID HAVING THE BALANCE
RUN AWAY FROM US.

--IF THE NEGOTIATIONS STALL OR FAIL, THE GERMANS WILL
FAVOR CLOSER STRESS ON HARDWARE BUILDUP. THEY WOULD
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WANT A VARIETY OF SYSTEMS AND VEHICLES, PRINCIPALLY

GLCM'S, ALCM'S, MORE FBS, AND A LONGER-RANGE PERSHING.

--THE GERMANS DO NOT RPT NOT WANT A FINGER ON THE
NUCLEAR TRIGGER AND THEY DO NOT RPT NOT WANT NUCLEAR
CO-DETERMINATION OR ANOTHER MLF. THEY WANT THE
UNITED STATES TO REMAIN THE NUCLEAR GUARANTOR OF
EUROPE, BUT THEY ALSO WILL WANT -- IF NEGOTIATIONS
FAIL -- TO HAVE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT MORE
VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF THEATER DETERRENTS THAT CAN STRIKE
WELL INTO THE SOVIET UNION. END SUMMARY.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED.

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EXDIS

THE STATE OF GERMAN PREPARATIONS

1. THE GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTRY FINISHED ITS OWN PAPER ON GRAY AREA SYSTEMS AND FORWARDED IT TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE ABOUT A MONTH AGO. THE FOREIGN OFFICE IS NOW STAFFING ITS PAPER AND WILL PRESENT THAT PAPER, ALONG WITH ITS OWN COMMENTS ON THE DEFENSE MINISTRY PAPER (OR ONE JOINT PAPER) TO THE FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL IN LATE AUGUST OR IN EARLY SEPTEMBER.
2. THE GERMANS TELL US THAT THEY HOPE TO BE READY FOR CONSULTATION WITH US DURING SEPTEMBER, PERHAPS AROUND THE MIDDLE OF THE MONTH. BLECH SAYS THAT HE THINKS THE FOUR POLITICAL DIRECTORS MAY WISH TO DISCUSS THIS TOPIC, INTER ALIA, BUT HE ALSO SAYS THAT THE GERMANS HOPE TO HAVE SEPARATE BILATERALS WITH US, EITHER THROUGH EMBASSIES OR DIRECTLY, BEFORE GOING INTO
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FOUR-POWER CONSULTATIONS.

3. THE GERMANS EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO FOCUS ON THE PROTOCOL AND ON FBS AS SOON AS SALT III BEGINS, AND THEY FAVOR HAVING THE ALLIANCE READY TO TAKE THE

INITIATIVE ON THESE AND RELATED TOPICS. THUS, THEY HOPE TO REACH SOME ALLIANCE CONSENSUS OVER THE FALL AND WINTER.

4. THIS PAPER REPORTS GERMAN THINKING AT ITS PRESENT STILL TENTATIVE STATE OF EVOLUTION. IT IS BASED ON CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR AND FOREIGN OFFICE POLITICAL DIRECTOR BLECH, DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER RUTH, FMOD PLANNING CHIEF STUETZLE, AND FMOD/ISA DIRECTOR ALTENBURG, AS WELL AS ON CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER OFFICIALS AND ON OUR ANALYSIS OF OTHER EVIDENCE REGARDING GERMAN THINKING.

5. IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE DEPARTMENT AND OTHERS IN FORMULATING APPROACHES HERE, WE SHALL KEEP WASHINGTON AND OTHER ADDRESSEES UP TO DATE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AS GERMAN PAPERS ADVANCE FURTHER AND AS FRG THINKING EVOLVES.

WHAT LIES BEHIND GERMAN CONCERNS

1. AS THE GRAY AREA ISSUE HAS BEEN ADVANCING OVER THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF, THE SINGLE MOST CHARACTERISTIC ATTITUDE OF THE GERMANS HAS BEEN A GENUINE FEAR OF THE GROWING DISPARITIES IN THEATER WEAPONRY. AS WE HAVE REPORTED BEFORE, THE GERMANS ARE PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SS-20 BUT ALSO WORRIED ABOUT THE BACKFIRE. THEY SEE NO APPARENT REASON
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FOR A SOVIET BUILD-UP OF SUCH PROPORTIONS IN AN ERA OF DETENTE, AND THEY SUSPECT THE WORST. THEY DO NOT APPEAR TO BE ENGAGED IN THE CLASSICAL ARGUMENT OF INTENT VERSUS CAPABILITY, BUT INSTEAD ARE ASKING THEMSELVES WHAT POLITICAL REASON MOTIVATES SUCH A HEAVY BUILD-UP.

2. COUPLED WITH THIS, THE GERMANS SENSE THAT WESTERN, AND PARTICULARLY AMERICAN, ATTITUDES TOWARDS THEATER SYSTEMS ARE BASED ON CONSIDERATIONS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE WHICH MOTIVATE GERMAN ATTITUDES. THEY THINK THE AMERICAN INTEREST IN SALT IS DRIVING AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES, AS IS THE GENERAL WESTERN ATTITUDE ON MBFR. CURIOUSLY, THEY SHARE THE DESIRE FOR SUCCESSFUL SALT AND MBFR AGREEMENTS, BUT THEY ALSO FEAR THAT EAGERNESS FOR THESE AGREEMENTS COULD JEOPARDIZE GERMAN SECURITY INTERESTS.

3. CENTRAL TO GERMAN ATTITUDES, OF COURSE, REMAINS THE SINGLE MOST RELEVANT FACT ABOUT THE GERMAN STRA-

TIGIC POSITION: THE FRG, FOR MANY REASONS, WILL NEVER HAVE THE MEANS TO DEFEND ITSELF. IT MUST RELY ON OTHERS, PRINCIPALLY OURSELVES. THEREFORE, UNLIKE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH, IT TENDS ALWAYS TO SENSE A GREATER OBLIGATION TO INFLUENCE AMERICAN POLICY AND ATTITUDES.

4. THE GERMANS, PERHAPS MORE THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY, ARE WEDDED TO THE NOTION OF DETERRENCE IN EUROPE. WHAT WE DESCRIBE AS A "TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT" IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE FOUGHT ON THEIR SOIL. THAT IS WHY THEY HAVE NEVER FELT AS KEEN ABOUT "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE" AS WE HAVE, BUT INSTEAD PLACE SUCH GREAT STRESS ON THE ES-

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SENTIALITY OF DETERRENCE. THEY FEAR THAT A EUROPEAN IMBALANCE WOULD ENCOURAGE SOVIET ADVENTURISM, ESPECIALLY WHEN COUPLED WITH A GENERAL STRATEGIC BALANCE OR -- AS WE OURSELVES HAVE PREDICTED -- A POSSIBLE PERIOD OF US STRATEGIC INFERIORITY.

5. IT HAS NOW BEEN BROUGHT HOME TO THE GERMANS THAT A NUMBER OF NEGOTIATIONS HAVE RESTRICTED OUR SIDE OF THE THEATER BALANCE (SALT II ON ALCM; THE PROTOCOL ON ALL CRUISE MISSILES; OPTION III ON PERSHING AND FBS).

THOUGH THEY TOOK PART IN SOME OF THESE DECISIONS, THE TOTAL IMPACT HAS ONLY NOW HIT THEM. SO HAS THE FACT THAT, WHILE WE KEPT FBS OUT OF SALT, THE SOVIETS BUILT UP THEIR OWN EQUIVALENT.

6. THE GERMANS HAVE NO QUESTION ABOUT OUR DETERMINATION TO DETER AND NO QUESTION ABOUT OUR DETERMINATION TO FIGHT TO PRESERVE THE EUROPEAN FRONT. THEY HAVE
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DEEPLY APPRECIATED THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT ASSURANCES AND HAVE SPOKEN OF THEM MOST WARMLY. WHAT HAS CONCERNED THEM IS THAT THE SOVIETS MAY MISCALCULATE ON THE BASIS OF A NUMERICAL JUDGMENT OF THE BALANCE, AND THEY WANT TO AVOID PERMITTING THE SOVIETS EVER TO BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN CONDUCT A RISK-FREE ADVENTURE ON THE FRONT THAT RUNS THROUGH THE MIDDLE OF HISTORIC GERMANY.

7. THE GERMANS ARE NOT YET REPEAT YET CONCERNED ABOUT A SOVIET BUILD-UP IN SHORT-RANGE TACTICAL WEAPONRY, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE HAD INFORMAL REPORTS THAT SUCH A BUILD-UP IS OCCURRING. THEY ARE MAINLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE MEDIUM-RANGE SOVIET WEAPONS. WE BELIEVE THIS MAY BE IN PART BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT YET FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE SHORTER-RANGE BUILD-UP. IN LARGER MEASURE, HOWEVER, WE ATTRIBUTE IT TO THE GERMAN CONCENTRATION ON DETERRENCE. THEY REGARD MEDIUM AND LONGER-RANGE WEAPONS AS POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS AND DETERRENCE INSTRUMENTS, WHEREAS THEY APPEAR TO REGARD SHORTER-RANGE HARDWARE PRIMARILY AS BATTLE FACTORS.

GERMAN VIEWS ON THE PROCESS AND STRUCTURE OF GRAY AREA NEGOTIATIONS

1. AS WE HAVE INDICATED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT PREFERS THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK TO THE HARDWARE TRACK. HE DOES THIS IN PART BECAUSE OF HIS OWN COMMITMENT, AS WELL AS THE COMMITMENT OF HIS GOVERNMENT, TO THE CONTINUATION OF DETENTE.

2. SCHMIDT'S COMMITMENT TO DETENTE RESTS IN PART ON
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HIS APPRECIATION OF THE FRG'S INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

HE BELIEVES THAT THE FRG, LOCATED IN THE CENTER OF EUROPE, CAN BEST SOLVE ITS INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS IN AN AURA OF DETENTE RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION. HE THINKS THAT CONFRONTATION WOULD LEAD TO A HARDENING OF LINES AND WOULD NEGATE MANY OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE DETENTE PERIOD, INCLUDING THE CLOSER CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANIES, BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE SMALLER STATES OF EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE SOMEWHAT EASIER -- THOUGH ALWAYS PRECARIOUS -- STATE OF AFFAIRS WITH MOSCOW.

3. SCHMIDT ALSO QUESTIONS WHETHER HIS COALITION COULD SURVIVE THE END OF THE DETENTE ERA. THE LEFT WING OF THE SPD WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REJECT SOME OF THE POLICIES THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE PURSUED DURING AN ERA OF CONFRONTATION. MOREOVER, ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL BASES OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE SPD/FDP COALITION, THE GENUINE ACHIEVEMENTS OF DETENTE FOR GERMANY (E.G., EASE OF TRAVEL BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANY AS WELL AS ACROSS THE SECTOR BORDER IN BERLIN, GREATER TELEPHONE AND POSTAL CONTACT, ETC.) WOULD PROBABLY ERODE. MANY GERMANS BELIEVE THAT A CDU GOVERNMENT WOULD BE BETTER ABLE TO CONDUCT A POLICY OF CONFRONTATION, AND SCHMIDT COULD FEAR THAT HIS OWN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED.

4. WHILE THE GERMANS THUS FAVOR NEGOTIATIONS, THEY HAVE NOT YET ADVANCED THEIR STUDIES TO THE POINT WHERE THEY HAVE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON THE FORM AND STRUCTURE OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. WHAT THEY TELL US, HOWEVER, BOILS DOWN ESSENTIALLY TO THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

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-- THE GERMANS WOULD PREFER TO HAVE GRAY AREA SYSTEMS NEGOTIATED IN A SALT RATHER THAN IN A TALT FORUM. SOME OF THEM, IN FACT, SEE THE WHOLE GRAY AREA QUESTION AS A SALT III ISSUE. THEY BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO STRESS THE UNITY OF WHAT THEY TERM THE STRATEGIC COMPONENT OF DETERRENCE, AND THEY SEE THAT UNITY AS REACHING FROM MEDIUM-RANGE THROUGH LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS. THEY FEAR THAT A SEPARATE FORUM FOR MIDDLE-RANGE SYSTEMS WOULD WEAKEN THE WESTERN BARGAINING POSITION BY COMPELLING US TO NEGOTIATE SEPARATELY AN AREA IN WHICH WE ARE AT A CONSIDERABLE NUMERICAL DISADVANTAGE. THEY ALSO FEAR THAT A SEPARATION OF THE SYSTEMS IN THE NEGOTIATING FORUM WOULD LEAD TO MENTAL ATTITUDES COMPATIBLE WITH DE-COUPPING. THUS, THEY SEE A CONTINUUM OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, CENTRAL AND EUROPEAN, AS THE TOPIC OF NEGOTIATIONS.

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-- THE GERMANS WOULD FAVOR HAVING THE UNITED STATES REMAIN THE NEGOTIATOR OF THE WESTERN POSITION. THEY RESPECT THE IMMENSE U.S. EXPERIENCE IN STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BEHIND THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE A SET OF ALLIANCE STRUCTURES THAT WOULD BE USED TO COORDINATE INSTRUCTIONS AS WELL AS TO CONSULT.

-- THAT SET OF STRUCTURES, AS THE GERMANS APPEAR TO CONCEIVE IT, WOULD INCLUDE A NATO-WIDE FORUM SUCH AS THE NAC, PERHAPS SUPPORTED BY A SPECIAL ORGANIZATION CREATED SPECIFICALLY TO BACK UP THE TALKS (SOMEWHAT ALONG THE LINES OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP).

-- THE GERMANS DO NOT YET APPEAR TO HAVE DECIDED HOW TO GET AROUND THE PROBLEM OF BRITISH AND FRENCH ABSTINENCE. IN FACT, THEY SOMETIMES DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE DEFINITELY ACCEPTED SUCH ABSTINENCE. FOR EXAMPLE, BLECH IN A RECENT CONVERSATION TOLD THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION FROM MERILLON THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN

CONSULTING ON GRAY AREA NEGOTIATIONS EVEN IF THEIR OWN SYSTEMS WERE NOT BEING NEGOTIATED. THIS IS PROBABLY ONE OF THE REASONS WHY THE GERMANS ARE STILL THINKING IN TERMS OF THE NAC AS A PRINCIPAL CONSULTATIVE BODY RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF SOME SPECIFIC ORGANIZATION THAT WOULD EXCLUDE BOTH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH.

-- HOWEVER, DESPITE THE UNCERTAINTY REGARDING SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONS, AN UNCERTAINTY WHICH WE ASSUME WILL BE RESOLVED AS CONSULTATIONS PROGRESS, IT APPEARS CLEAR THAT THE FRG DOES NOT REPEAT NOT FAVOR AN MBFR-STYLE FORUM, IN WHICH A
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NUMBER OF WESTERN AS WELL AS EASTERN NATIONS WOULD PARTICIPATE. NOR DOES IT WANT ANY FORUM THAT SUGGESTS WE ARE NEGOTIATING FOR A SEPARATE EURO-STRATEGIC BALANCE.

-- THE GERMAN CONCEPT FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE THAT THE WEST WOULD TRY TO NEGOTIATE SOME REDUCTION IN SOVIET SYSTEMS WHILE ALLOWING A WESTERN BUILD-UP THAT WOULD BRING US TO NEAR PARITY. THEY WANT THE WEST TO NEGOTIATE THE SOVIETS DOWN WHILE BUILDING ITSELF UP.

HARDWARE ASPECT

1. THE GERMANS DO NOT PERCEIVE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN A NEGOTIATING SCENARIO AND A HARDWARE SOLUTION, ALTHOUGH THEIR PAPERS TEND AS MUCH AS THOSE OF OTHERS TO SEPARATE THE TWO ISSUES. THE HARDWARE SECTION IS PRINCIPALLY DRAFTED IN THE DEFENSE MINISTRY WHEREAS THE DIPLOMATIC SCENARIO IS DRAFTED IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

2. AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, THE FRG PREFERS A POLITICAL TO A HARDWARE SOLUTION. HOWEVER, BOTH FOREIGN OFFICE AND DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED TO US THEIR CONCERN THAT THE SOVIET BUILD-UP IS MOVING SO RAPIDLY THAT A NEGOTIATING SOLUTION MAY BE INADEQUATE TO THE TASK OF RESTORING A BALANCE. THEY BELIEVE (AS WE INDICATED IN REF B) THAT IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE THE SOVIETS DOWN VERY MUCH IN THE LIGHT OF IMBALANCES WHICH ALREADY EXIST AND WHICH ARE GROWING RAPIDLY BECAUSE OF PRESENT PROGRAMS.

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MOREOVER, THEY ARE ACUTELY AWARE THAT WE CANNOT USE
THE BRITISH, FRENCH OR SACEUR SYSTEMS AS NEGOTIATING
ASSETS, ALTHOUGH THEY APPRECIATE THAT THOSE SYSTEMS
SERVE AS DETERRENCE ASSETS.

3. THEREFORE, THERE HAS BEEN SOME GERMAN THINKING
ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF INITIATING, IN THE NEAR
FUTURE, PROGRAMS THAT WOULD IMPROVE ALLIANCE
CAPABILITIES IN GRAY AREA SYSTEMS. AS YET, IT APPEARS
THAT GERMAN PREFERENCES ARE NOT CLEARLY DEFINED. OUR
CONVERSATIONS SUGGEST THAT PRELIMINARY GERMAN THINKING
FOR EARLY ACTIONS IS FOCUSED ON DEVELOPMENT AND DE-
PLOYMENT OF A PERSHING WITH A RANGE OF 2,000-PLUS
KILOMETERS AND MORE FBS AIRCRAFT.

4. THE GERMANS THINK THAT WE SHOULD PERHAPS GO AHEAD
WITH DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH SYSTEMS IF THE SOVIET BUILD-UP
CONTINUES, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF GRAY AREA NEGOTIA-
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TIONS START. THEY THINK A CERTAIN BUILD-UP IS REQUIRED
FOR ITS OWN SAKE, AND ALSO BELIEVE IT WILL BE

ESSENTIAL TO GIVE SOME CREDIBILITY TO OUR NEGOTIATIONS
IN THE LIGHT OF EXISTING DISPARITIES.

5. THE GERMANS RECKON QUITE SERIOUSLY WITH THE DANGER
THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD DRAG OR FAIL. IN THAT
CASE, THEY WOULD OBVIOUSLY FAVOR A VERY RAPID
HARDWARD BUILD-UP BY THE ALLIANCE.

6. CERTAIN PRINCIPLES APPEAR FUNDAMENTAL TO
GERMAN THINKING ABOUT GRAY AREA HARDWARE. (IT SHOULD
BE NOTED THAT THESE PRINCIPLES APPLY TO WHAT THE
GERMANS DEFINE AS GRAY AREA SYSTEMS, I.E., SYSTEMS
OF C. 1000-PLUS KILOMETER RANGE.) THOSE PRINCIPLES
ARE:

-- THE GERMANS DO NOT WANT ABSOLUTE PARITY,
PARTLY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE IT HAS A DE-COUPPING EFFECT
AND PARTLY BECAUSE THEY THINK IT WOULD ABSORB AN UN-
NECESSARY AMOUNT OF RESOURCES. HOWEVER, SOME GERMAN
OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT, IF THE SOVIETS INSIST ON A
NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE IN THEATER SYSTEMS, THE WEST
SHOULD DEMAND COMPENSATING NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE IN
GLOBAL SYSTEMS.

-- THE GERMANS DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT THEIR OWN
NUCLEAR SYSTEM. THEY CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A MOVE AND ITS POTENTIALLY
DESTABILIZING EFFECTS. WHAT THEY PREFER IS A TWO-KEY
SYSTEM OR A SYSTEM UNDER WHICH THE NUCLEAR WARHEADS
ARE HELD UNDER SACEUR CONTROL.

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-- BY THE SAME TOKEN, THEY DO NOT WANT ANYTHING
SIMILAR TO WHAT HAD BEEN PROPOSED UNDER THE MLF.

-- HOWEVER, IT IS LESS CLEAR WHETHER THEY WOULD
WANT BUNDESWEHR CONTROL OF VEHICLES THAT WOULD HAVE
BOTH CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS AND NUCLEAR POTENTIAL.
FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS POSSIBLE, THOUGH BY NO MEANS CER-
TAIN, THAT THEY MIGHT WISH TO HAVE ADDITIONAL FBS
AND PERHAPS CRUISE MISSILES IN GERMAN UNITS. WE
WISH TO STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS A QUESTION ON
WHICH WE HAVE FOUND NO DEFINITIVE VIEWS AND ON WHICH
WE ARE NOT OURSELVES ABLE TO REVIEW ALL THE LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS. THEREFORE, ANY WASHINGTON REACTION
OR PLANNING SHOULD AWAIT CONSULTATIONS.

-- THE GERMANS DEFINITELY WANT
SYSTEMS STATIONED ON THE GROUND AND IN WESTERN EUROPE,

INCLUDING GREAT BRITAIN. THEY WANT THIS BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE SUCH SYSTEMS ARE MORE CREDIBLE AS DETERRENTS THAN SLBMS OR SLCMS. THEY ALSO PREFER TO HAVE OTHER NATIONS ACCEPT STATIONING IN ORDER TO SPLIT THE RESPONSIBILITY AND SO AS NOT TO FIND THEMSELVES ISOLATED IN THE POLITICAL ATTITUDES THAT MIGHT EMERGE FROM HAVING SUCH SYSTEMS STATIONED.

-- OVER THE LONG RUN, THE GERMANS FAVOR DEVELOPMENT OF A VARIETY OF WESTERN SYSTEMS TO PARRY THE SOVIET THREAT. THEY BELIEVE SUCH SYSTEMS SHOULD INCLUDE MORE FBS (E.G., F-111, TORNADO, ETC.), A LONGER-RANGE PERSHING, AND A VARIETY OF CRUISE MISSILES -- IN PARTICULAR GLCM'S AND ALCM'S. THEY APPEAR TO FAVOR SUCH VARIETY FOR MILITARY REASONS, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY ALSO THINK THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL IN THE LIGHT OF

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CONSTRAINTS ON ALCM'S IN SALT II, ON CRUISE MISSILES IN THE PROTOCOL, AND ON OTHER VEHICLES IN OPTION III. (WE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE FRG HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY INFORMED BY US THAT WE HAVE PASSED TO THE SOVIETS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE OPTION III LIMITATIONS.)

-- WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE GERMANS WOULD FAVOR DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF A NEW THEATER MRBM. WE SUSPECT THE GERMANS WOULD NOT WANT ONE UNLESS NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN COMPLETELY AND THE SOVIET BUILD-UP ACCELERATED. HOWEVER, TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE SUCH A SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN STAFFED HERE.

-- OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE, IN GERMAN EYES, IS THE ABILITY OF WESTERN SYSTEMS TO STRIKE AT TARGETS WELL WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS CENTRAL TO GERMAN THINKING THAT DETERRENCE WILL NOT WORK IF THE SOVIETS
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BELIEVE THEY CAN ATTACK WESTERN EUROPE AT LITTLE RISK TO THEIR OWN LAND.

THE RANGE OF SOLUTIONS

1. AS WE HAVE INDICATED ELSEWHERE, THE GERMAN PAPERS HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLETED AND THE CHANCELLOR HIMSELF HAS NOT YET DECIDED ON GERMAN POLICY. THEREFORE, ANY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOLUTIONS THAT WILL BEST SERVE OUR INTERESTS HERE MUST BE SOMEWHAT SPECULATIVE.

2. THIS SAID, WE BELIEVE THE PRINCIPAL SOLUTION MUST LIE IN THE POLITICAL RATHER THAN IN THE HARDWARE AREA. WE THINK THE GERMANS WILL WANT A HARDWARE SOLUTION OF SOME KIND, AT LEAST IN PARTIAL COMPENSATION, AT SOME POINT. HOWEVER, THE MAIN GERMAN PURPOSE APPEARS TO BE A DESIRE TO HAVE A GREATER DIRECT INFLUENCE ON DECISION-MAKING REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS THAT AFFECT THE EUROPEAN BALANCE.

3. THE GERMANS WANT TO BE ABLE IN FUTURE TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS AFFECTING THEATER HARDWARE TO A MUCH GREATER DEGREE THAN AT PRESENT, AND THEY FEEL THAT THEY WANT TO HAVE BETTER ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT ANY SINGLE DECISION WILL MEAN FOR THE TOTALITY. THEY HAVE BEEN INADEQUATELY STAFFED FOR A THOROUGH STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, AND THEY STILL ARE, BUT CONSULTATIONS WITH US WOULD IN THEIR EYES PERHAPS PRODUCE A MORE ACCURATE PICTURE.

4. THEREFORE, A PRINCIPAL ELEMENT IN A SOLUTION WOULD BE SOME CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM, PROBABLY MORE STRUCTURED THAN ANYTHING NOW ON THE BOOKS, TO PREPARE FOR
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THEATER ARMS NEGOTIATIONS AND TO MONITOR THE IMPACT ON THE THEATER BALANCE OF ANY OTHER NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH A FORUM WOULD HAVE TO HAVE A HEAVY US-FRG BILATERAL ELEMENT, ALTHOUGH THE GERMANS WOULD WANT ALSO TO GIVE IT A NATO STAMP TO AVOID THE "WASHINGTON-BONN AXIS" SYNDROME.

5. THOUGH FEW GERMAN OFFICIALS SEE MUCH HOPE THAT ANY GRAY AREA NEGOTIATION CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTED IN THE LIGHT OF PRESENT AND GROWING DISPARITIES, THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF OUR OVER-ALL INTEREST IN STABLE DETENTE RELATIONS IN EUROPE, IT SHOULD NOT BE WE WHO DISCOURAGE THE GERMANS FROM SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, UNLESS WE CAN SUBSTITUTE SOMETHING BETTER OR UNLESS WE ARE ABSOLUTELY PERSUADED THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE.

6. LAST BUT NOT LEAST MAY HAVE TO COME A HARDWARE SOLUTION. AS WE INDICATE ABOVE, SOME ELEMENTS OF THAT SOLUTION MIGHT HAVE TO COME INTO BEING EVEN BEFORE OR AS NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE, IF INDEED THEY CAN TAKE PLACE. WE THINK THOSE MIGHT INCLUDE MORE FBS AND AN ADVANCED MODEL PERSHING. IF NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN AND THE SOVIET BUILD-UP CONTINUES, THE HARDWARE SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE MORE EXTENSIVE. MEEHAN

SECRET

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